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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SEAN M. DONAHUE, 
 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
DAUPHIN COUNTY; DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON; PA STATE CAPITOL POLICE; 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES; UNKNOWN 
DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON GUARDS AND ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES; 
KATIE LYNN ADAM; RICHARD C. SHUR; LISA M. SAUDER; MARY JANE 
MCMILLAN; HEATHER ROTH; ELAINE B. STALFA; DEBORAH E. CURCILLO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00890) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 14, 2021 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Appellant Sean Donahue, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals an 
order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
dismissing his civil rights action. We will dismiss this appeal as frivolous and malicious.  
In 2016, Donahue was convicted in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for 
Dauphin County for harassment, based on threatening emails he had sent to various 
public employees and officials, and sentenced to two years’ probation. Despite ongoing 
attempts to appeal his conviction, Donahue filed a federal civil rights action against 
several defendants related to the criminal charges. The Middle District of Pennsylvania 
dismissed that action as barred by the favorable-termination requirement of Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), and we summarily affirmed. See Donahue v. 
Dauphin Cnty. Solics. Off., 788 F. App’x 854, 857 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam).  
While that first civil rights action was pending in this Court, three relevant events 
occurred: Donahue was denied permission to appeal his conviction to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, see Commonwealth v. Donahue, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018) (table); the 
U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari in his direct criminal appeal, see 
Donahue v. Pennsylvania, 138 S. Ct. 2626 (2018) (mem.); and Donahue filed his second 
civil rights action against the same defendants based on the same facts, see Donahue v. 
Dauphin County, No. 1:18-cv-0839, 2018 WL 3217478 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2018). The 
District Court dismissed that second action on largely the same grounds as the first, and 




Undeterred, Donahue filed this, his third civil rights action against a nearly 
identical slate of defendants, based on the same events surrounding the investigation, 
trial, and conviction.1 Yet again, a Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of his 
complaint; yet again, the District Court adopted that recommendation; yet again, 
Donahue timely filed a notice of appeal. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint as frivolous or malicious. See 
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2020). Having granted Donahue’s 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court, we must make an independent 
determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and must dismiss his appeal if it is 
malicious, i.e., it “is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant[s],” Deutsch v. 
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995), or if it is frivolous, meaning it “lacks 
an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
The former inquiry examines the litigant’s subjective intent, but the latter is an objective 
standard. See Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1086–87.  
Donahue’s appeal is subjectively malicious. The District Court based its own 
conclusion that the complaint was malicious on Donahue’s litigation history, noting that 
 
1 This is not Donahue’s only line of repetitive litigation. He has lodged other meritless 
challenges to this and a separate conviction for similar conduct, see, e.g., Donahue v. 
Super. Ct. of Pa., No. 19-1625, 2019 WL 4665756 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2019), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 1245 (2020), and has filed several suits against government agencies and 
officials seeking the benefits he claims to have been denied, see, e.g., Donahue v. Acosta, 




this Court and our sister circuits have held that “[r]epetitious litigation of virtually 
identical causes of action may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.” 
McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Yet no better evidence of his state of mind exists than his own 
words—words that led to his criminal conviction and that he conveniently appended to 
his complaint here. Two of the missives that a Pennsylvania jury found sufficiently 
harassing to warrant criminal sanction disclose Donahue’s subjective intent in pursuing 
these subsequent civil complaints. First, in an email dated November 26, 2014, Donahue 
wrote to the head of the Pennsylvania Civil Service Commission (and including some of 
the named defendants here as recipients) that if his demands for various veterans’ 
employment benefits were not met:  
I will pursue punishment of you, the remaining Commission members, and 
the senior employees of the Commission for your even attempting to 
control access to the courts. By doing so, you will face the very same court 
actions that [the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry] now claims 
its employees faced and fear that they still face from me. This is a threat 
and I make that threat with the full confidence of Democracy and no fear 
whatsoever of the federal and state courts.  
Compl. App. 38–39, ECF No. 1-3. Then, in an email dated November 29, 2014, he wrote 
to various recipients, including some of the named defendants in this action: “I am going 
to find a LEGAL way to pound the [expletive] out of your government agencies and I’m 
going to use that method, whatever it is in whatever context makes it LEGAL, to pound 
your employees into submission until they stop denying me my benefits.” Id. at 47. 
Donahue’s voluminous filings in state and federal court since he wrote these words 
clearly demonstrate an intent to vex, injure, and harass these defendants “into 
5 
 
submission.” We strongly reject Donahue’s assumption that he is entitled to use the 
courts for these purposes. 
Moreover, this appeal is frivolous for its total lack of arguable merit in law or fact. 
Donahue has been told by this Court on two prior occasions that as part of a civil rights 
action, these claims implicate the validity of his conviction, and are therefore barred by 
the favorable termination requirement. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Here, as the 
District Court noted, Donahue did not even challenge the applicability of the Heck bar to 
his claims; he merely seeks to overturn that decision. See Order at 2 n.1, ECF No. 11. 
Similarly, on appeal, he quarrels with the holding of Heck and its progeny in our circuit, 
asserting that he “must first pass through the Appellate court and must be an aggrieved 
party” to ultimately challenge Heck in the Supreme Court. Resp. at 2, CA3 ECF No. 5. 
Yet Donahue raised the same arguments about what he perceives to be the errors of Heck 
and this Court’s line of cases thereafter in a previous meritless suit. His complaint here 
“incorporates” nearly fifty pages of what appears to be a petition for certiorari “not 
adjudicated by the [U.S.] Supreme Court” and intended to follow his second civil rights 
action. Compl. at 5, ¶ 6, ECF No. 1 (referring to M.D. Pa. docket number 1:18-cv-
00839); see also id. at 6–54 (reproducing petition). However, Donahue has not cited any 
record of his having petitioned the Supreme Court following that action, nor have we 
been able to find one. His desire to raise untimely challenges to Heck and its progeny 
now, after failing to seek certiorari when appropriate, is entirely insufficient to justify 
proceeding with a precluded case. Donahue makes no arguments in support of his appeal 
on which to base an opposite conclusion.  
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Related to his repetitious challenges to the Heck bar, the District Court also 
dismissed Donahue’s complaint as frivolous based on principles of res judicata that apply 
with equal force to this appeal. Res judicata bars a suit when there has been: “(1) a final 
judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) involving the same parties or their privies; and 
(3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 
584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court dismissed Donahue’s second civil 
rights case—in which all but one of the named defendants are identical to the instant 
action—with prejudice as Heck barred (as discussed above) and time barred, and we 
affirmed. See Donahue, 747 F. App’x at 43–44. A dismissal based on the running of the 
statute of limitations is a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of res judicata. See 
Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173. Thus, all claims dismissed as time barred in the previous 
action are barred here by res judicata.  
We also find that Donahue’s purportedly “new” evidence is, in fact, an argument 
he has already presented to this Court. In his second civil rights action, when requesting 
rehearing en banc, Donahue made the same claims about his “new knowledge” of 
Defendant Gregory Budman’s employment as a police officer that he makes here in 
support of his right to a new cause of action. Compare Pet. for Reh’g at 4–6, Donahue v. 
County of Dauphin, 747 F. App’x 42 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2568) (emphasizing the 
“new knowledge that Budman is a cop”), with Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1 (claiming “a right 
to a new cause of action” based on the discovery of this same defendant’s employment). 
Not only have we heard these claims, but as the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, 
Budman was a defendant in Donahue’s second case from the outset. See R. & R. at 10, 
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ECF No. 5. Res judicata bars claims that were brought or could have been brought in a 
prior suit based on the same cause of action. See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173. Thus, we 
find that Donahue could have brought these claims against Budman at the time of filing 
his second civil rights complaint, and did in fact present his arguments to this Court in his 
prior case, and therefore the claims are barred by res judicata, rendering this appeal 
frivolous. 
Finally,2 between the second action and the instant one, Donahue added Judge 
Curcillo to the list of defendants. As the Magistrate Judge and District Court found, she is 
protected by absolute judicial immunity from liability for her conduct during Donahue’s 
trial. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). Furthermore, Donahue’s 
assertion that the judge employed “MindShark” techniques on the jury to sway them in 
the prosecution’s favor is, in the words of the Magistrate Judge, “fanciful, fantastic, 
delusional, irrational, and wholly incredible,” R. & R. at 11, ECF No. 5, and ultimately, 
“patently frivolous,” id. at 17–18. 
For all these reasons, we will dismiss his appeal as frivolous and malicious. We advise 
Donahue to refrain from filing further frivolous or malicious appeals in this Court to 
avoid the imposition of sanctions, such as forfeiting the privilege of proceeding without 
payment of fees or other appropriate measures. 
 
2 The District Court also found other miscellaneous grounds to dismiss Donahue’s 
complaint, largely based on sovereign and individual immunities. See R. & R. at 21–22; 
Order at 1. We affirmed these same grounds for dismissal in the previous action, see 
Donahue, 747 F. App’x at 43–44, and thus they are incorporated into our consideration of 
res judicata.  
